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Abstract 
 
I argue that to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of 
action whose content is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of 
these nonconceptual representations and of their relations to action representations at higher 
levels sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form 
nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underwrites the capacity to 
acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under 
intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual 
representations enjoy and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor 
control set limits on intentional control over action execution. 
 
Keywords: action; motor representation; nonconceptual content; motor control; intentional 
control. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at (1) providing a defense of the notion of representations with nonconceptual 
content (henceforth, nonconceptual representations for short) in the domain of action, 
showing that this notion is both coherent and explanatorily useful, (2) specifying the relations 
between these representations and higher-level conceptual representations also involved in 
action control, and (3) assessing their impact, both positive and negative, on intentional action 
control.  
The very idea of intentional control implies that intentions can have a causal impact on action 
in virtue of their contents. Perhaps the most basic obstacle to the exercise of intentional 
control lies in the inability to convert intentions into actions. The efficacy of intentions 
depends on their executability and, I shall argue, their executability ultimately depends on the 
availability of relevant motor representations. However, it is not sufficient for the exercise of 
intentional control that relevant motor representations be available, they must also be 
appropriately harnessed to intentions. Thus, an exploration of nonconceptual representations 
and their relations to higher-level representation of action is also an exploration of the outer 
bounds of intentional control over actions.  
The notion of nonconceptual content was first explicitly introduced by Gareth Evans (1982). 
On a standard formulation, a mental state has nonconceptual content if it is possible for a 
subject to be in that state without possessing any of the concepts a theorist would use in 
giving a specification of the state’s content. This characterization, one should note, is purely 
negative. Positive characterizations of the notion of nonconceptual content depend on the 
domains in which it is applied. Since its inception, the notion of nonconceptual concept has 
been deployed in three main representational domains with different explanatory projects 
(Bermúdez, 2007; Bermúdez & Cahen, 2008).  
The first, and the one that has most exerted philosophers, is the project of characterizing the 
content of perceptual experience, clarifying the epistemological relation between perceptual 
states and belief states, accounting for the phenomenological differences between beliefs and 
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perceptions, and explaining the acquisition of observational concepts. The second project is 
that of characterizing the contents of the representational states attributed to pre-linguistic or 
non-linguistic creatures in much contemporary developmental and comparative psychology, 
cognitive ethology and cognitive archeology. Finally, the third project is that of characterizing 
the content of the subpersonal representational states postulated by the dominant paradigm of 
cognition as information-processing.  
With but a few exceptions (Hurley, 1998), nonconceptual content has played very little role in 
discussions of the nature and contents of representations of action. As a consequence, 
attempts to motivate positing nonconceptual content have almost never adduced 
considerations arising from the study of action. A specific defense of the notion of 
nonconceptual representations in the domain of action involves showing that this notion does 
useful explanatory work in that domain and giving a positive account of the nonconceptual 
content of representations of action. 
I will proceed as follows. My first task will be to try and demonstrate the usefulness of 
nonconceptual representations. In section 2, my argument will be that standard models of 
action explanation are incomplete, leaving an explanatory gap between the mental antecedent 
of an action and the specific act it causes and that in order to fill this gap we need to introduce 
representations of the movements that will implement the intended actions. In section 3, I will 
further argue that the most basic of these representations cannot be conceptual representations 
but must be seen as nonconceptual.  In section 4, I will offer a positive characterization of 
these nonconceptual representations of action and highlight their distinctive features. Finally, 
in section 5, I’ll explore in what sense these nonconceptual representations both enable and 
set limits to intentional control.  
2. The problem of the wrong movement  
I briefly described above a number of explanatory projects where the notion of nonconceptual 
content has been brought into play. Many of these projects have counterparts in the domain of 
action. Appeal to nonconceptual representations may be thought necessary to account for the 
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distinctive features of the phenomenology of action and to ground action concepts. Insofar as 
creatures who altogether lack concept-forming abilities or haven’t yet acquired relevant 
concepts appear to engage in forms of intentional action or at least goal-directed behavior, the 
notion of nonconceptual content may be utilized to account for these abilities.  It may also be 
utilized to characterize the content of the subpersonal representational states implicated in 
tacit knowledge of the motor rules and biomechanical constraints postulated in theories of 
motor cognition. Here, I will focus on a particular problem, the problem of the wrong 
movement, and argue that we need appeal to non-conceptual representations to solve that 
problem.  
In philosophical action theory it is customary to explain actions in terms of the beliefs and 
desires that motivated the agent to act has she did. Typically, a motivating complex for action 
A is thought to include a pro-attitude toward actions with a certain property P – such as 
bringing about a certain result or state of affairs, an orienting belief of the agent that she is in 
circumstances C and an instrumental belief that action A in C has property P. Typically as 
well, the success of failure of the action is thought to depend on the truth or falsity of the 
beliefs in the motivating complex.  
However, this standard causal model of action explanation is faced with several difficulties. I 
will here consider only one of them, the problem of the wrong movement, pointed out by 
Israel, Perry and Tutiya (1993).1 The problem is that the failure of an action cannot always be 
traced back to the falsity of some belief figuring in the motivating complex as it conceived of 
in the standard model. Israel et al. illustrate this with the following example. Suppose Brutus 
intends to kill Caesar by stabbing him. His orienting belief that Caesar is to his left and his 
instrumental belief that stabbing Caesar in the chest would kill him may both be true and yet 
Brutus may fail to kill Caesar because he makes the wrong movement and misses Caesar 
completely. In other words, the truth of the beliefs figuring in the motivating complex as it is 
traditionally conceived does not guarantee that the bodily movement performed by the agent 
is appropriate.  
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Furthermore, his movement could be wrong in two different ways. It could be the case that he 
simply does not make the movement he was trying to make or it could be that he makes the 
movement he was trying to make but that that movement is not the right one — in other 
words, Brutus is wrong to think that that movement would constitute a stabbing of the person 
to his left. Israel et al.'s conclusion is that something is missing in the traditional account: 
"Brutus' motivating complex needs to reflect which movement he is trying to make, and what 
he thinks its effect will be" (1993: 528). 
On Israel et al.'s view, for a motivating complex to really explain an action, it must include 
not just a desire for a certain result, an orienting belief, and an instrumental belief, but also 
what they call a belief-how. Whereas an instrumental belief is a belief that performing a 
certain action is a way of achieving a certain result – e.g., stabbing Caesar is a way of killing 
Caesar –, a belief-how concerns the relations between movements and action – performing 
movements of a certain kind in certain circumstances constitute a stabbing of Caesar in those 
circumstances. Moreover, for an agent to have such a belief-how, not just any idea of the type 
of movement in question will do, the agent must have an executable idea of it. That is, he 
must know how or think he knows how to perform movements of this type.  
In this model the gap between the motivating complex and the act it motivates if filled by a 
belief-how. Yet, it remains somewhat unclear how exactly Israel et al. conceive of the 
movement representations involved in beliefs-how. They could have in mind a detailed 
representation of a very specific bodily movement (or sequence thereof) where this would 
also require of the agents that they have very detailed beliefs about the circumstances, since 
exactly what movements should be performed depends on what exactly the circumstances are. 
Alternatively, they could have in mind a more schematic representation of a type of bodily 
movement. As Dokic (1999) points out, they are faced with a dilemma. The first option is not 
very plausible. It requires the agent to form a very detailed representation of the movement 
before its execution, but this threatens to impose an excessive cognitive burden on the agent, 
especially if the movement is somewhat complex. On the other hand, if we take the second 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 Other difficulties include the notorious problem of causal deviance as well as problems posed by the status of 
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option and let the representation of the movement be schematic, we will not be in a position to 
account for the specific conditions of success of the action, where this success depends on 
how well movements are adjusted to circumstances.  
Yet, there is one way out of the dilemma. The dilemma depends on the assumption that all the 
representational work has to be done and be over with before the execution starts. But this 
assumption is quite implausible. Representations do not just trigger the action; they also guide 
and control it until its completion. One way to account for the specific conditions of success 
of an action, while avoiding the problem of cognitive overload, is to consider that the 
representations that guide and control the movement are not fully specified before its onset 
but are dynamical and relational and serve to adjust the movement to the changing context in 
which it unfolds. To put it another way, the degree of specification of the bodily movements 
depends on the degree of specification of the circumstances. It is implausible to suppose that 
an agent represents all these circumstances in advance of the action.  
Israel's et al. themselves insist that we are attuned to a limited range of environments and that 
facts that are uniform or stable in those environments (e.g. Earth's gravitational force, the 
impenetrability of physical bodies, illumination from above in outdoors environments) need 
not be explicitly represented because they are already reflected in the way agents are built 
both physically and cognitively. But the point here is that even if we limit ourselves to 
circumstances that are variable and relevant to the success of the action, we need not 
explicitly represent them in all their details before starting to act. It is enough that the agent 
represents the circumstances to the extent that he can discern that they allow for an action that 
would bring out a certain result to be performed and also discern that executing movements of 
a certain type would be a mode of accomplishing this action in those circumstances.  
Very general and stable circumstances don't have to be explicitly represented at the level of 
the motivating complex, because they are already reflected in the way we are built. The 
variable circumstances that have to be represented for an action to be executed divide, I 
contend, into macro-circumstances, represented in advance of action and at the level of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
automatic or spontaneous actions. 
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motivating complex and into very specific and transitory micro-circumstances that are 
represented as the action proceeds.  
This distinction allows us to give a better account of the problem of the wrong movement. 
Recall that this problem is twofold. The agent may be wrong in thinking that performing a 
movement of a certain type would bring about some intended result or, although he is right in 
that respect, the movement he performs is not of that type. Israel et al. have a ready 
explanation for wrong movements of the first category. Here, the agent's belief-how explains 
why he makes the movement he does and the incorrectness of his belief-how explains why his 
movement is wrong. But the only thing they can say about the second category of wrong 
movement is that the belief-how does not cause a movement of the type it represents. On this 
picture the wrong movement is in no way rationalized; what we have is only the brute fact of 
a causal failure. But if instead of just considering beliefs-how, we also consider the dynamical 
representations internal to the execution of the action, failures of the second kind may also be 
made intelligible. Thus, in order to account for wrong movements in the second category, we 
need to appeal to a further level of movement representations. Let us call these latter 
representations motor representations.  
3. Motor representations as nonconceptual representations 
The relation of beliefs-how to motor representations is, I shall contend, analog in several 
important ways to the relation of perceptual beliefs to perceptual experience, where the 
content of perceptual beliefs involves observational concepts and an observational concept of 
X, is partially individuated  by its relation to a way of perceptually representing X. As pointed 
out by Bermúdez (2007), one central argument for the claim that perception has 
nonconceptual content is the priority argument. The observational concepts we possess are a 
function of the perceptual discriminations we are capable of making, not the other way round. 
Therefore, we cannot take observational concepts to be explanatorily basic. If the proposed 
analogy between action and perception holds, then motor representations have nonconceptual 
content and the executable concepts of movements that are constituents of the contents 
beliefs-how are the action-analogs of observational concepts.  
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As defined by Tutiya et al., an executable concept of a type of movement is a representation, 
that could guide the formation of a volition, itself the proximal cause of a corresponding 
movement. Possession of an executable concept of a type of movement thus implies a 
capacity to form volitions that cause the production of movements that are instances of that 
type. Such executable concepts of movements can only be possessed, I will argue, by agents 
that already have executable nonconceptual representations of movements. The argument here 
is an instance of the priority argument. It is simply that the executable concepts we possess 
are a function of the movements we are capable of executing. It is not the case that the 
movements we are capable of executing depend on the executable concepts we possess 
(although, as we shall discuss in section 5, it may be the case that the movements we are 
capable of producing intentionally depend on the executable concepts we possess). But the 
capacity to execute movements of a certain type requires that the agent already have 
executable representations of those movements. If circularity or infinite regress are to be 
avoided, these executable representations cannot in turn involve executable concepts of 
movement types.  
But why insist that the executable concepts an agent can possess depend on the movements 
the agent herself can perform and why insist that performance of these movements involve 
executive representations? This insistence is motivated by the need to secure the executability 
of these concepts. We can indeed acquire concepts of types of movement by simply watching 
someone else perform movements of that type. But these will typically be observational rather 
than executable concepts of movements. If I am a spectator at an ice-skating competition, I 
may indeed form observational concepts of the movements performed by the skaters based on 
my perception of them. But the concepts in question may well fail to be executable concepts. 
That I formed a concept of a certain movement by watching an ice-skater perform a triple-
axel in no way guarantees that I will be able to perform this movement myself. Similarly, I 
will not acquire an executable concept of a movement type by simply observing some 
movement my body makes, if the movement in question is simply a bodily happening (a 
feverish shaking of my body, say) rather than a movement I can effect. Thus, a genuinely 
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executable concept must hook up to movements that are already under the control of motor 
representations. An executable concept is a concept of movements already executable by the 
agent, not a concept of movements that in some mysterious way would make them 
executable.  
Let me take stock. I have argued that the executable concepts an agent can possess are a 
function of the movements he is capable of executing and that executable movements are 
movements that are under the control of motor representations. On pain or circularity or 
regress, these motor representations cannot themselves already involve concepts of 
movements and thus must have nonconceptual content. Nor should their nonconceptual 
content be identified with nonconceptual perceptual content, for nonconceptual perceptual 
representations of movement do not constitute a sufficient basis for the formation of 
executable concepts of movements.  
4. Content and directionality of motor representations 
What exactly are the contents of nonconceptual motor representations, how do they guide and 
control movements and what is their directionality? For answers to these questions we must 
turn to the cognitive neuroscience of action. I will not attempt to review the already 
considerable and fast growing empirical literature on motor representations. For my present 
purpose, a brief description of the main characteristics of these representations will suffice.  
It is now generally agreed that there exist two visual systems, dedicated respectively to vision 
for action and for the identification and recognition of objects and scenes (Milner & Goodale, 
1995, Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The vision for action system extracts from visual stimuli 
information about the properties of objects and situations that is relevant to action, and uses 
this information to build motor representations used in effecting rapid visuo-motor 
transformations. The motor representations produced by this system have three important 
characteristics. First, the attributes of objects and situations are represented in a format useful 
for the immediate selection of appropriate motor patterns. For instance, if one wants to grab 
an object, its spatial position will be represented in terms of the movements needed to reach 
10 
 
for it and its shape and size in terms of the type of hand grip it affords. Second, these 
representations of the movements to be effected reflect an implicit knowledge of the 
biomechanical constraints and the kinematic and dynamic rules governing the motor system. 
Thus, for instance, the movements of the effectors will be programmed so as to avoid 
awkward or uncomfortable hand positions and to minimize the time spent in extreme joint 
angles. Third, a motor representation normally codes for transitive movements, where the goal 
of the action determines the global organization of the motor sequence. For instance, the type 
of grip chosen for a given object is a function not just of its intrinsic characteristics (its shape 
and size) but also of the subsequent use one wants to make of it. The same cup will be seized 
in different ways depending on whether one wants to carry it to one’s lips or to put it upside 
down. As this brief characterization makes clear, what motor representations represent are 
neither the current state of the agent’s body nor the current state of the environment, nor just 
the current relation between body and environment. Rather, what they represent are the ways 
(the motor patterns) through which the current relation can be transformed into a desired 
relation (goal state).2  
Another important aspect of motor representations is their dynamical character. Motor 
representations guide and control movements as long as they unfold. In order to guide 
movements, they must anticipate their effects. In order to control them, they must allow for 
adjustments during execution. Feedback – that is, visual, kinesthetic, or proprioceptive 
reafferences -- will be needed to make adjustments. For instance, in order to lift an object, the 
appropriate grip force and load force must be computed using information about size, texture, 
compliance, hardness and weight. But from vision alone one can only get rough estimates of 
some of these properties, sensory reafferences in other modalities resulting from one’s attempt 
at lifting the object will allow the motor system to make adjustments to the grip force and 
load force initially programmed.  The contents of motor representations are thus dynamical in 
the sense both that they get more determinate over time and that they are themselves 
                                                
2 For in-depth discussions of the properties of motor representations, see Jeannerod (1997, 2006) 
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responsible for making available the information needed for their further specification – this 
information is made available by the reafferences they yield.  
The relational and dynamical character of motor representations also heralds their distinctive 
directionality. Motor representations code simultaneously for things that are coded separately 
at the (conceptual) level of the antecedent motivating complex. The antecedent motivating 
complex for an action includes both conative and doxastic elements, namely, on the conative 
side, a desire that a certain result R obtain, and on the doxastic side, orienting beliefs, 
instrumental beliefs and beliefs-how. Situation, goal and means are thus represented 
separately at that level. There is no such dissociation at the level of motor representations. The 
situation is coded in terms of a goal it affords and the goal itself is coded in terms of the 
means — i.e. the motor commands —towards its achievement. Proto-doxastic and proto-
conative elements are thus inextricably intertwined. One consequence of this intertwining is 
that the classical distinction between states with a mind-to-word direction of fit and states 
with a world-to-mind direction of fit3 gets blurred at the level of motor representations. Motor 
representations are what Millikan (1995) calls pushmi-pullyu representations, having at once a 
mind-to-world and a world-to-mind direction of fit. A motor representation represents a 
situation as affording a certain goal (mind-to-world direction of fit), and it does so by 
representing the motoric means by which the goal is to be achieved (world-to-mind direction 
of fit).  
5. Nonconceptual motor representations and intentional control 
To a first approximation, we have intentional control over our actions to the extent that we are 
able to form and execute intentions geared towards the satisfaction of consciously endorsed 
goals. There are various obstacles to the exercise of intentional control. We may be aware of 
well-entrenched action tendencies that go against what we are trying to achieve and yet we 
                                                
3 The concept of direction of fit, introduced by Searle, is used in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two 
types of intentional mental states. States with a mind-to-world direction of fit (e.g., beliefs, perceptions, 
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may fail to inhibit the habitual responses they yield. Worse perhaps, we may be completely 
unaware of factors that influence our decisions and actions and as a result unable to resist 
their influence, being thus left with only the illusion of intentional control. However, the most 
basic obstacle to the exercise of intentional control lies not so much in the inability to resist 
countervailing influences than in the inability to convert intentions into actions, even absent 
such countervailing influences.  
As the problem of the wrong movement shows, one’s intention to perform a certain action A 
with a view to bring about result R will only succeed if one knows how to execute movements 
appropriate to the performance of A. Hence the need to introduce beliefs-how in motivating 
complexes if they are to really explain actions. To have beliefs-how, an agent must have 
executable concepts of types of movement and such executable concepts, or so I argued in 
section 3, must themselves be grounded on motor representations we antecedently possess; 
i.e. on executable nonconceptual representations of movements. 
Thus, the efficacy of intentions depends on their executability and their executability 
ultimately depends on the availability of appropriate motor representations. The availability of 
motor representations is not, however, a sufficient condition for the causal efficacy of 
intentions, only an enabling condition. The mediation of beliefs-how is needed to place motor 
representations under intentional control. Ideomotor apraxia provides a dramatic illustration 
of this point. People suffering from ideomotor apraxia know what one is supposed to do to 
perform a certain action, they know, say, that waving goodbye involves moving one’s arm 
and hand in a certain way and they can recognize that someone is weaving goodbye when 
seeing them. What they can’t do is consciously and voluntarily initiate and perform the action 
in the absence of environmental triggers (Wheaton & Hallett, 2007). In other words, they 
have intact motor representations of the relevant movements, they have concepts of the types 
of movements associated with an action enabling them to describe or recognize them, but 
what they seem to have lost are executable concepts of the types of movements needed to 
                                                                                                                                                   
memories) are true or satisfied if their contents fit an independently existing state of affairs the world. States with 
a world-to-mind direction of fit (desires, intentions) are satisfied if the world changes to match their content. 
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perform the action. Lacking those executable concepts, they are unable to voluntarily initiate 
actions.   
The alignment of intentions, beliefs-how and motor representations is made possible by the 
teleological structure they share.4 As I tried to show in section 4, the movements motor 
representations represent and bring about are relationally characterized movements — 
movements related to a certain goal.  Thus, intentions, beliefs-how and motor representations 
all represent relations between means and goals, although at different levels of grain. An 
intention represent an action of a certain type as a way of bringing about a certain result R in 
circumstances C, a belief-how represents the execution of movements of a certain type as a 
mode of bringing about R in circumstances C’ and thus accomplishing the action and motor 
representations represent motor commands as a way of executing these movements and 
bringing about R in circumstances C”, where circumstances C’ and C” are specifications of 
circumstances C that impose further constraints on action execution. Or, to put it the other 
way around, beliefs-how are representations of means to goals that abstract away from certain 
specifics of the circumstances of action and intentions are representations that abstract further 
away from these specifics.  
The availability of motor representations is an enabling condition of the efficacy of intentions. 
Through the mediation of beliefs-how these motor representations can come under intentional 
control. Motor representations do not depend on beliefs-how or intentions for their existence, 
however. To the extent that they retain some autonomy, they can eschew intentional control. 
There are at least two ways in which they can do so. One is simply that motor representations 
can be directly triggered by environmental stimuli or affordances and thus initiate actions. In 
such cases, intentional control is not in principle impossible. One can still veto or inhibit the 
execution of the action provided one notices what is going on. Yet, the vigilance required to 
do so rapidly puts a strain on attentional resources. Thus, when attentional resources are 
depleted or allocated elsewhere, environmentally triggered motor representations and ensuing 
actions can easily bypass intentional control.  
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A second, more principled, way in which motor representations resist intentional control 
relates to their limited cognitive penetrability and thus their partial autonomy. Some aspects 
of the operation of the motor system that generate motor representations appear to be 
consciously accessible. They are reflected in conscious motor imagery and provide the 
anchoring ground for executable concepts of types of movement. Yet, we are not aware of the 
way immediate sensory information is used for the fine-tuning of motor commands and thus 
of their precise details (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). For instance, several pointing 
experiments (Goodale et al., 1986; Castiello et al., 1991) have shown that in a task where 
subjects have to point with their finger a target, they can do so accurately even on trials where 
the target is suddenly displaced by several degrees and they have to adjust their trajectories. 
Moreover, they can do so while remaining completely unaware both of the displacement of 
the target and of their own corrections. What I called in section 4 the dynamical character of 
motor representations – their constant updating in response to sensory reafferences – is 
needed to insure smooth online corrections and adjustments of movements. Motor control, in 
other words, is subject to very tight temporal constraints. Intentional action control, on the 
other hand, is a form of conscious control based on consciously available information and 
conscious processing is comparatively slow. There is thus at least a partial incompatibility 
between the temporal constraints motor control must satisfy to be efficient and the temporal 
constraints on conscious processes. To that extent, the demands of motor control are 
incompatible with the demands of intentional control. 
To recap, our discussion of the contents and teleological structure of nonconceptual motor 
representations allowed us to explore some of the limits of intentional control. Motor 
representations are the proximal causes of goal-directed movements. On the one hand, the 
capacity to form motor representations underwrites the capacity to acquire the executable 
concepts of movements and thus to acquire beliefs-how. Beliefs-how in turn make it possible 
to harness motor representations onto intentions, thus permitting intentional action control.  
On the other hand, motor representations retain some autonomy. They can be formed 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 For further discussion, see Pacherie (2006, 2008). 
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independently of intentions and as a result may bypass intentional action control. Their role in 
motor control makes also them subject to specific temporal constraints, at least partially 
incompatible with the temporal constraints of intentional action control. Thus, as well as 
enabling, via beliefs-how, intentional control over action execution, motor representations 
also set limits on intentional control.5 
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